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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
William Jack Bias appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty plea 
to felony DUI. On appeal, Bias argues the district court erred by denying his 
motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions to 
withdraw his guilty plea and for a reduction of sentence. He also argues the 
court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In September 2012, an officer observed Bias' vehicle "drifting in its lane, 
driving on top of the white fog line, traveling under the speed limit, and then 
braking hard when approaching a curve in the road." (PSI, p.3.) When stopped 
by the officer, Bias stated "he did not have a driver's license, was 'not sure' about 
his registration and insurance, and didn't know his address." (PSI, p.3.) The 
officer smelled the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and "observed a 
partially empty bottle of Jack Daniels Whiskey and a six pack of mostly 
consumed Smirnoff mixed alcohol bottles in the back seat." (PSI, p.3.) Bias'17-
year-old son was in the vehicle and "admitted to having taken a 'bug gulp,' of his 
Dad's whiskey and coke, from the bottle located on the console between the 
front seats." (PSI, pp.3-4.) Bias claimed ownership of the alcohol and admitted 
he had been drinking. (PSI, p.3.) His eyes were "red, glassy and watery" and 
his speech was "slow and lethargic." (PSI, p.3.) He failed field sobriety tests and 
subsequent evidentiary testing showed he had a BAC of .107/.106. (PSI, p.4.) 
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The state charged Bias with felony DUI (three or more DUI convictions in 
10 years) and misdemeanor injury to child. (R., pp.36-38.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Bias pled guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the remaining 
charge. (R., pp.45-46.) The district court accepted Bias' plea and imposed a 
unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.50-52.) Bias timely 
appealed. (R., pp.55-57.) He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
his sentence. (R., pp.53-54.) 
Before the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion, Bias filed a pro se 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Augmentation: "Motion To Withdraw Guilty 
Plea And Supporting Information" (hereinafter "Motion To Withdraw Plea"), filed 
June 4, 2013.) As the basis for his motion, Bias asserted he had entered his 
plea on the advice of counsel and under a good faith belief that counsel had 
provided him with adequate information concerning his defenses. (Motion to 
Withdraw Plea.) Bias further asserted that, "[u]pon further investigation[]," he 
discovered counsel was aware of, but "neglected to pursue possible defenses 
previous to [his] plea of Guilty" and, according to Bias, "said defenses would 
have provided a substantially different outcome." (Motion to Withdraw Plea.) 
Bias also filed a pro se motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue the 
motion for withdrawal of his plea, asserting therein that the failure of his 
previously appointed counsel to "adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit 
[had] caused the Attorney/Client relationship to become irreparably damaged." 
(Augmentation: "Motion For Appointment Of Counsel And Supporting 
Information" (hereinafter "Motion for Counsel"), filed June 4, 2013.) 
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At a hearing on June 24, 2013, the district court took up Bias' Rule 35 
motion and his pro se motions for the appointment of counsel and withdrawal of 
his guilty plea. (See generally 6/24/13 Tr.) Bias was not present at the hearing, 
but his previously appointed trial counsel argued the Rule 35 motion on Bias' 
behalf. (6/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-13, p.17, Ls.8-22.) Counsel did not argue the 
merits of Bias' pro se motions but advised the court that he (counsel) had 
essentially construed those motions as a petition for post-conviction relief. (Tr., 
p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.7.) The district court agreed with counsel's characterization 
of Bias' pro se motions as reading like a post-conviction petition and, ultimately, 
denied them, reasoning: 
The Defendant is asking for the Court to appoint new 
counsel for him while his case is under appeal, under the 
circumstances I don't think the Court should appoint new counsel 
at this time. In essence, he's trying to get new counsel to handle 
Rule 35 - excuse me, post-conviction relief. Post-conviction relief 
has a process for the appointment of counsel and if postured 
correctly the Court certainly would consider that request. ... 
But, again, I am going to deny the Motions as filed, but I'm 
going to deny them without prejudice and certainly the Defendant 
can pursue these issues on post-conviction if he wishes to file a 
Petition that complies with the law .... 
But at this time the Court finds that there's no manifest 
injustice alleged except for ineffective assistance of counsel issues. 
Certainly the Defendant isn't arguing that he was innocent. If he 
was, then the Court would take a very different look at this, but the 
Defendant is basically arguing that he disagreed with Defense 
Counsel's handling of the case and that typically is a post-
conviction relief matter. 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.21, L.6 - p.22, L.8; see also Augmentation: "Order Denying All 
Pending Motions" (hereinafter "Order Denying Motions), filed June 24, 2013.) 
The court also denied Bias' Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, finding in 
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light of Bias' extensive criminal record and history of driving under the influence 
that "the original sentence imposed in this matter was appropriate." (6/24/13 Tr., 
p.19, L.7 - p.20, L.21; see also Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Bias states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bias' motion for 
the appointment of new counsel to represent him in regard 
to his Rule 35 motion and his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. 
Bias following his plea of guilty to a felony DUI? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Bias failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion for the appointment of counsel to pursue his post-
judgment motions? 
2. Has Bias failed to show the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, upon Bias' guilty plea 




Bias Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion For The 
Appointment Of Substitute Counsel To Pursue His Post-Judgment Motions 
A. Introduction 
Bias argues the district court erred in denying his motion for the 
appointment of substitute counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 1 Specifically, Bias contends, "based on both his 
constitutional right to counsel and his statutory right to counsel," that (1) the 
district court was required to appoint counsel to represent him on his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea because an actual conflict of interest existed between 
Bias and his previously appointed attorney, and (2) the court erred by failing to 
conduct an adequate inquiry into the basis for Bias' request for counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Bias' arguments fail for several reasons. First, 
because Bias does not challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, his claim on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by declining 
to appoint substitute counsel to pursue that motion is necessarily moot. Second, 
even if the issue is not moot, Bias had no constitutional right to the appointment 
1 Bias also contends the court should have appointed substitute counsel to 
represent him on his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-12.) Although the district court indicated it would allow Bias to reopen 
his Rule 35 motion if the court granted his motion for the appointment of counsel 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.7-17), it does not appear that Bias ever requested 
substitute counsel in relation to the Rule 35 motion (compare Motion for Counsel 
and Motion to Withdraw plea, filed pro se on June 4, 2013, with R., pp.53-45 
(Rule 35 Motion, filed by counsel on April 16, 2013)). Having never asked the 
district court to appoint counsel to pursue his Rule 35 motion, Bias' claim that the 
district court erred by not doing so is not properly before this Court on appeal. 
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of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, as 
such, the district court had no duty to appoint substitute counsel based on any 
alleged conflict or to inquire of Bias personally regarding the basis for his motion. 
Third, contrary to Bias' assertions, the statutory "right" to counsel in post-
judgment proceedings is not coextensive with the constitutional right to counsel 
and, therefore, the court was not required to follow the procedures required 
under the Sixth Amendment to rule on Bias' request for substitute counsel; 
instead, the court's decision whether to appoint substitute counsel in relation to 
Bias' post-jUdgment motion was purely discretionary. Finally, correct application 
of the law shows the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bias' 
motion for the appointment of new counsel in the post-judgment phase of the 
criminal case to pursue what was effectively an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[T]he decision of whether to appoint substitute counsel lies within the 
discretion of the trial court and will only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, _, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation 
omitted); see also I.C. § 19-856 (trial court may, for good cause, appoint 
substitute counsel). 
C. Bias' Challenge To The Denial Of His Motion For The Appointment Of 
Substitute Counsel Is Moot 
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." State v. 
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Barclay, 149 Idaho 6,8,232 P.3d 327,329 (2010) (citations omitted). "A case is 
moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will 
have no practical effect upon the outcome." In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337, 340, 
179 P.3d 300, 303 (2008) (quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000». The mootness 
doctrine precludes review when "the issues presented are no longer live or the 
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Idaho Schools for 
Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 
644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,432,816 P.2d 986, 
989 (1991». 
Bias argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion 
for the appointment of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) The district court, however, 
determined that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in the 
motion for withdrawal of the plea would be more appropriately addressed in a 
separate post-conviction action and so denied the motion without prejudice to 
allow Bias to pursue those claims, and seek the assistance of counsel, pursuant 
to the provisions of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. (Order Denying 
Motions; 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8.) On appeal, Bias does not 
challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (See Appellant's 
brief, p.3 n.2.) Because the court's determination that the merits of the motion 
for withdrawal of the plea are better suited for a post-conviction action is 
unchallenged, Bias' claim on appeal that the court should have appointed 
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substitute counsel to pursue the motion to withdraw the plea is necessarily moot 
because there is no longer any such motion to pursue. A remand for the 
appointment of counsel to pursue a motion Bias apparently concedes should be 
litigated in a different forum will have no practical effect upon the outcome of the 
case. The issue is therefore moot and this Court should decline to consider it. 
D. Bias Had No Sixth Amendment Right To Be Represented By Counsel On 
His Post-Judgment Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 
counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 
P.2d 415 (1981)). Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it 
does not extend to post-conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 
327, 336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). See also 
Murphy v. State, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 712695, *5 (Idaho 2014) (pet. for reh'g 
pending) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)) ("'[T]here is 
no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings."'). Like 
other post-conviction proceedings, a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and, as such, a 
defendant has no constitutional right to an attorney to pursue such a motion. 
State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404 (Ct. App. 2010). Because Bias 
had no constitutional right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, his claim on appeal that the district court had a duty 
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under the Sixth Amendment to inquire regarding the basis of Bias' request for 
substitute counsel andlor to appoint substitute counsel (see Appellant's brief, 
pp.5-12) necessarily fails. 
E. The Trial Court's Decision Whether To Appoint Substitute Counsel 
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-856 Was Discretionary And Not Subject To The 
Procedures Necessary To Safeguard The Constitutional Right To Conflict-
Free Counsel In The Critical Stages Of A Criminal Case 
Idaho Code § 19-852 confers upon indigent defendants the right to be 
represented by counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings, including all non-
frivolous post-conviction proceedings. Consistent with his statutory right, Bias 
was represented by the county public defender throughout the criminal 
proceedings, including the pursuit of his Rule 35 motion. (See R., pp.23, 27, 33, 
39-42, 45-46, 48-49, 53-54; 2/11/13 Tr.; 3/18/13 Tr.; 6/24/13 Tr.) After he was 
sentenced, Bias moved for the appointment of new counsel to pursue a post-
judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that his previously 
appointed attorney "failed to adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit," thus 
"caus[ing] the AttorneylClient relationship to become irreparably damaged." 
(Motion for Counsel, ~4.) The district court denied the motion, reasoning that 
Bias' request to withdraw his guilty plea - a request based on allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel - would be more appropriately addressed in a 
separate action for post-conviction relief. (6/24113 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8; 
Order Denying Motions.) 
Citing the standards applicable to the right to conflict-free counsel 
conferred by the Sixth Amendment and I.C. § 19-852, Bias argues on appeal 
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that the district court, having become aware of an "actual conflict of interest" 
between trial counsel and Bias, was required to appoint substitute counsel to 
assist Bias in pursuing his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 
was also required to inquire of Bias personally regarding the basis of his request. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Bias' arguments fail on their premise. The district 
court's decision whether to appoint substitute counsel to pursue a post-judgment 
motion was not governed by the procedures required by the Sixth Amendment to 
safeguard the right to conflict-free counsel in the critical stages of a criminal 
case. Two cases, Murphy v. State, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 712695 (Idaho 
2014) (pet. for reh'g pending), and Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 
1275 (Ct. App. 2007), are particularly instructive on this point. 
In Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed in what circumstances a 
statutory "right" to counsel also carries with it the guarantees of effective 
assistance of counsel and conflict-free counsel. Murphy, _ P.3d at _, 2014 
WL 712695, *6. The Court distinguished between statutes that mandate the 
appointment of post-conviction counsel versus those that leave the decision to 
appoint counsel within the district court's discretion. 19.:. Citing Idaho Criminal 
Rule 44.2, which "provides for the mandatory appointment of counsel for post-
conviction review after the imposition of the death penalty," the Court noted its 
recent holding in Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _, 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013), 
"that post-conviction petitioners sentenced to death have the right to conflict-free 
counseL" Murphy, _ P.3d at _, 2014 WL 712695, *6. The Court then 
contrasted Rule 44.2 with I.C. § 19-4904, which leaves the decision to appoint 
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post-conviction counsel in a non-capital case within the discretion of the district 
court. 1st Because the appointment of counsel under I. C. § 19-4904 is 
discretionary, the Murphy Court observed that that statute does not even "create 
a statutory right to post-conviction counsel," id. (citing Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 
286,291, 17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000)), much less a right to the effective assistance 
of counsel in non-capital post-conviction proceedings. See 1st ("Where there is 
no right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of the effective assistance of 
counsel."). Thus, the Court effectively held that only statutes making the 
appointment of counsel mandatory confer upon indigent litigants the right, 
normally associated with the Sixth Amendment, to the effective assistance of 
counsel. 
Recognizing that a post-conviction petitioner has no constitutional or 
statutory right to counsel, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Rios-Lopez v. State, 
144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007), that the procedures required to 
rule on a request for substitute counsel made by a criminal defendant with a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel do not apply in post-conviction proceedings. 
The Court reasoned: 
[W]e are not persuaded by Rios-Lopez's reliance on cases 
addressing the procedures necessary to rule on a criminal 
defendant's request to substitute counsel in criminal proceedings. 
See State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 (2002); 
State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980); 
State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 
1997). Both a criminal defendant and an applicant for post-
conviction relief may be appointed a substitute counsel if good 
cause is shown for such substitution. See I.C. § 19-856. However, 
determining whether good cause exists to substitute counsel for a 
criminal defendant differs from determining whether good cause 
exists to substitute cou nsel for an applicant for post-conviction 
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relief because the underlying rights to counsel differ. A criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel; but, in Idaho, an 
applicant for post-conviction relief does not even have a statutory 
right to counsel. See Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902 & n. 1, 908 P.2d at 
595 & n. 1. See also I.C. § 19-4904. Indeed, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel may not be brought because 
the applicant for post-conviction relief does not have a right to 
effective assistance of counsel. See Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902-03, 
908 P.2d at 595-96. Because Nath, Clayton, and Peck address the 
procedures necessary to protect a criminal defendant's 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal 
proceedings, those cases are inapposite. 
Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79. Cases addressing "the 
procedures necessary to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings" are likewise "inapposite" 
in this case because, as already discussed above, Bias had no constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
Bias' request for substitute counsel was governed by I.C. § 19-856, which 
provides provides that, "[a]t any stage, including appeal or other post-conviction 
proceeding, the court concerned may for good cause assign a substitute 
attorney." (Emphasis added). Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, the 
decision whether to appoint substitute counsel is discretionary. Accord State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009); State v. Lippert, 152 
Idaho 884, _,276 P.3d 756,759 (Ct. App. 2012). Because the statute makes 
substitution of counsel discretionary, and because Bias had no constitutional 
right to be represented by counsel to pursue his post-judgment motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the procedures mandated by the Sixth Amendment to 
guarantee effective assistance - such as the duty to inquire into conflicts of 
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interest - did not apply. Murphy, _ P.3d. at _, 2014 WL712695, *6; Rios-
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79. Bias' assertions to the 
contrary are without merit. 
F. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Bias' Motion 
For The Appointment Of Substitute Counsel To Pursue In Post-Judgment 
Proceedings What Was Effectively An Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Claim 
"'A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant 
upon a showing of good cause.'" State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 297 P.3d 244 
(2013) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 
(2009)); see also State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, _, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. 
App. 2012); I.C. § 19-856. "Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a 
decision that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be 
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion." Severson, 147 Idaho at 702, 
215 P.3d at 422 (citing State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 
(2002)). "The trial court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of 
discretion if it violated the defendant's right to counsel." kl (citing Nath, 137 
Idaho at 715, 52 P.3d at 860). 
Bias argues the district court was required to appoint substitute counsel to 
represent him on post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims he alleged in that motion "created an 
actual conflict of interest as trial counsel had a personal interest in seeing those 
claims denied." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) There is no question that, in 
circumstances where an indigent defendant has a right to counsel, an actual 
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conflict of interest constitutes "good cause" mandating the appointment of 
substitute counsel. li, Lippert, 152 Idaho at _, 276 P.3d at 759. As 
discussed above, however, Bias had no constitutional right to counsel to pursue 
his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, State v. Hartshorn, 149 
Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404 (Ct. App. 2010), and any statutory entitlement to 
counsel depended on the viability of the motion, see I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) (no 
entitlement to counsel to pursue frivolous post-conviction or post-commitment 
proceedings). 
The district court, in its discretion, determined that Bias' motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea failed to satisfy the "manifest injustice" standard of I.C.R. 
33, and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleged therein would be 
"more appropriately determined under Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act." (Order Denying All Pending Motions; see also 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, 
L.22 - p.22, L.8.) In making this determination, which Bias does not challenge 
on appeal, the district court effectively ruled that Bias' post-judgment motion was 
not one a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at 
his own expense in the criminal proceeding. Because the motion was frivolous, 
Bias was not statutorily entitled to counsel, much less substitute counsel, to 
pursue the motion. I.C. §§ 19-852, 19-856. 
Even assuming Bias had a statutory right to counsel to pursue his post-
judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he has failed to show the existence 
of any "actual conflict of interest" that would have mandated the appointment of 
substitute counsel. Trial counsel did not argue the merits of Bias' motion for 
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withdrawal of his guilty plea (see 6/24/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.22), and the 
district court denied the motion without prejudice on the basis that the issues 
presented therein would be more appropriately addressed in a separate post-
conviction action (see Order Denying Motions; 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22, 
L.8). In so ruling, the district court actually avoided any potential conflict that 
would have arisen had trial counsel been required to argue the merits of the 
motion and litigate his own alleged ineffectiveness. Because Bias does not 
challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea - and, more 
particularly, the court's determination that the claims therein would be better 
disposed of in a separate post-conviction action - he has failed to show any 
abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for substitute counsel to pursue 
that motion. 
II. 
Bias Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Bias challenges the unified sentence of 1 ° years, with five years fixed, 
imposed upon his guilty plea to felony DUI, contending the sentence is excessive 
in light of the mitigating factors he claims are present in this case. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.12-14.) A review of the record and of the applicable law supports the 
sentence imposed. Bias has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
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397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. !s:L. 
C. Bias Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. !s:L. 
Thirty-five-year-old Bias has over a 20-year history of violating the law. 
(PSI, pp.1-2, 4-13.) By his own account, "he was arrested for the first time 
around age 13, for underage consumption of alcohol." (PSI, p.12.) Between his 
thirteenth and eighteenth birthdays, he was adjudicated for a string of juvenile 
offenses, ultimately resulting in a two-and-one-half-year period of incarceration in 
a juvenile detention facility. (PSI, ppA-7, 12.) He committed his first felony, 
possession of methamphetamine, when he was just 18 years old. (PSI, pp.8, 
12.) Within three days of being placed on probation for that offense, Bias was 
charged with his second felony, driving without privileges, and was sentenced to 
a "Rider." (PSI, pp.9, 12.) Just two months after being placed on probation 
following his rider, Bias drove while intoxicated and caused an accident that 
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resulted in the death of his passenger. (PSI, pp.9, 12.) He was convicted of 
vehicular manslaughter and served 10 years in prison, during which time he was 
a disciplinary problem. (PSI, pp.9, 12-13.) After being released from prison in 
May 2008, Bias committed multiple misdemeanor driving and alcohol-related 
offenses, including at least three misdemeanor DUl's. (PSI, pp.10-13.) In fact, 
he was on probation for a 2012 misdemeanor DUI when committed the felony 
DUI to which he pled guilty in this case. (PSI, p.13.) 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court "very carefully" 
reviewed the presentence materials, including the substance abuse and mental 
health evaluations that indicate Bias suffers from alcohol dependence and 
depressive disorder for which he is in need of treatment. (3/18/13 Tr., p.18, L.6 
- p.19, L.20.) The court considered Bias' "remarkable" record of juvenile 
adjudications and adult convictions and noted the only significant period of time 
Bias abstained from breaking the law was during his 10-year period of 
incarceration, "although [he was] breaking the rules of prison." (3/18/13 Tr., 
p.19, L.20 - p.21, L.2.) The court articulated its consideration of the objectives 
of sentencing, observing with respect to the primary objective of protecting 
society that "it's hard to understate [sic] the importance of that element of 
sentencing because [Bias has] a history of not only drinking and driving, but ... of 
killing people when [he does] so." (3/18/13 Tr., p.21, Ls.12-23.) In light of Bias' 
history, the court found it particularly aggravating that Bias had his 17-year-old 
son in the car with him when he committed the DUI in this case. (3/18/13 Tr., 
p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.17.) The court also considered deterrence and rehabilitation 
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but found it hard to gauge those objectives in light of the fact that Bias had been 
neither deterred nor rehabilitated by prior legal sanctions and treatment 
opportunities. (3/18/13 Tr., p.22, L.18 - p.23, L.18.) Finally, the court 
considered the need for punishment in the form of a prison sentence, which the 
court deemed "a very realistic outcome" given Bias' prior record. (3/18/13 Tr., 
p.24, Ls.3-20.) Taking into account all the objectives of sentencing, and carefully 
considering the criteria of I. C. § 19-2521, the court concluded that a 10-year 
sentence, with the first five years fixed, was not only warranted, but necessary, to 
protect the community from Bias' unyielding propensity to drink and drive. 
(3/18/13 Tr., p.24, L.21 - p.33, L.2.) 
On appeal, Bias does not contest any of the information upon which the 
district court relied in crafting his underlying sentence. Instead, he claims only 
that the court should have given greater weight to factors he deems mitigating, 
including his "difficult childhood," his "history of mental health issues," the fact 
that he provided financial support for three of his four children, and his assertion 
that his actions in this case were induced by grief over his brother's death. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) There can be no question that the district court was 
aware of these "mitigating factors" when it imposed Bias' sentence. In fact, the 
court specifically articulated its consideration of all of these factors in crafting 
Bias'sentence. (See 3/18/13 Tr., p.18, L.18 - p.19, L.18, p.23, L.19 - p.24, L.2, 
p.25, L.4 - p.26, L.8.) That the court did not assign these factors greater weight 
or elevate them above the need to protect society while at the same time 
providing Bias an opportunity for structured rehabilitation does not show the 
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sentence is excessive. Bias' sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed is more 
than reasonable given the nature of his crime and his demonstrated failures to 
be rehabilitated or deterred despite prior treatment opportunities and legal 
sanctions. Bias has failed to show an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and 
sentence and the district court's order denying Bias' post-judgment motion for 
the appointment of counsel. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2014. 
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